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I. INTRODUCTION 
Standard economics assumes individuals to evaluate their welfare in absolute terms. Choices 
affect only the agents directly involved. However, individuals may judge their own situations 
in relation to other individuals’ situations. Leading economists, such as Adam Smith, Karl 
Marx, Thorstein Veblen or James Duesenberry, have long expressed the importance of the 
relative position and social concerns.. Nevertheless, standard economics pays little attention 
to the consequences of relative position. Accordingly, Senik (2005), providing an overview of 
the literature, points out that “it is surprising that in spite of the large theoretical literature on 
relative income and comparison effects […] empirical validation of this conjecture is still 
scarce” (p. 47). 
Research on happiness (for example, Easterlin 1974, 1995, 2001, Clark and Oswald 
1996, Watson et al. 1996, Groot and van den Brink 1999, Tsou and Liu 2001, McBride 2001, 
Lyubomirsky 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b, Stutzer 2004, Kingdon and Knight 2004, 
Layard 2003, Luttmer 2005, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Dorn et al. 2005) has found strong 
empirical support for the importance of the relative position Also, laboratory experiments 
using the ultimatum game indicate that subjects are concerned with their relative position 
(Frank and Sunstein 2001, Kirchsteiger 1994). Furthermore, as an alternative strategy, some 
researchers have used hypothetical questions regarding choice between alternative states or 
outcomes, where the choices allow for checking out relative positional concerns (Alpizar et al. 
2005, Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, Solnick and Hemenway 1998, Tversky and Griffin 
1993, Zeckhauser 1991). Nevertheless, many economists are still skeptical of the importance 
of positional concerns, because empirical evidence about its behavioral relevance remains 
scarce.  
This paper links positional concerns to observable behavior in the field by looking at 
an individual’s work performance. Relative income is certainly a major determinant of 
people’s position. Thus, Frank and Sunstein (2001, p. 347) stress that “[…] positional 
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concerns typically loom larger with income than with the goods that regulation attempts to 
provide (safety, leisure time, leave to take care of children and ailing relatives).” This paper 
also contributes to the growing literature that investigates the link between pay and 
performance. However, contrary to previous studies, we also investigate the relevance of the 
relative income position. Lazear (2000, p. 1346) points out that: “Much of the theory in 
personnel economics relates to effects of monetary incentives on output, but the theory was 
untested because appropriate data were unavailable”1.  
A key compensation policy discussed in the literature is that of the promotion 
tournament. Lazear and Rosen (1981) started to theoretically investigate the behavior of 
players in response to the incentives created by a tournament.2 The effect of positional 
differences on performance is theoretically open. Some theories suggest that the resulting 
frustration (of those with a low position) leads to resignation and poorer performance. Other 
theories suggest that a larger positional difference induces individuals to try to achieve a 
higher position, and hence raises performance. This paper argues that various factors 
systematically influence which of the two effects is likely to prevail. The more individuals are 
integrated into a particular social environment, the more differences in relative position lead 
to frustration and poorer performance. The individuals concerned may feel that they have 
little possibility to change their social position, so that they tend to resign themselves, thus 
lowering their performance. In contrast, less well-integrated individuals are less burdened by 
positional concerns and a given income difference therefore has little or no effect on their 
performance.  
Empirical analysis of the behavioural impact of positional concerns is hindered by the 
lack of useful income data. The opportunity of using sports data has led to a growing 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Abowd (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) for studies 
that investigate the relationship between pay and managerial performance or corporate returns, or Asch 
(1990) for Navy recruiters reactions to different incentive plans. 
2  See also, for example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), O’Keefe, Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1988), McLaughlin (1988), Rees (1992), Prendergast (1999).  
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empirical literature, testing existing theory with sports data3 (see Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
1990a, 1990b, Becker and Huselid 1992, Orszag 1994, Lynch and Zax 1998, 2000, Fernie and 
Metcalf 1999, Maloney and McCormick 2000, Melton and Zorn 2000, Sunde 2003). This 
paper uses sports data to investigate the impact of soccer players’ relative income position on 
their performances. The broad sample covers eight seasons of the German premier soccer 
league (Bundesliga) between 1995/1996 and 2003/20044, including 2833 observations and 
1114 players, a salary proxy and several performance variables. The empirical data has low 
variable errors. Performance is clearly observable and is free of discrepancies, compared to 
frequently used performance variables, such as GDP. Furthermore, soccer games are 
comparable to field experiments due to the fact that a match takes place in a controlled 
environment. Soccer players are faced with the same rules and restrictions. Thus, when 
investigating the connection between relative concern and performance, many factors can be 
controlled for. The paper analyzes to what extent the relative income position of a player 
affects his sport performance, holding the absolute income level constant. The relative income 
position is proxied by the difference between teammates’ average salaries and players’ 
individual salaries. The empirical results are robust5. The results are consistent with the 
general hypothesis that the relative income position has a strong impact on players’ individual 
performance. The larger the income differences in a team are, the worse is the performance of 
the players. The econometric estimates are also consistent with the more specific hypothesis 
that social integration strengthens this negative effect on performance.  Section II provides a 
short overview of the relevant literature. Section III develops our theoretical approach. 
Section IV presents the empirical results and Section V discusses implications for business 
practice and offers concluding remarks. 
                                                 
3  There are also some studies that test the theory of tournaments outside the context of sport  (see, e.g., 
Knoeber and Thurman 1994, Eriksson 1999, Rees 1992).  
4  It was not possible to consider the year 1997 because no proxy for players’ salaries is available). 
5  We also used the ratio, instead of the differences, and the results remain robust.  
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II. POSITIONAL CONCERNS: AN OVERVIEW 
Positional concerns due to relative judgments are common. People constantly compare 
themselves with their environment and care greatly about their relative position, which 
influences individual choices. Thus, not only is the absolute level of  an individual’s situation 
important (e.g., income), but also the relative position. 
Marx (1849) stresses that we measure our wants and pleasures in relation to society. 
Similarly, Galbraith (1958) points out that consumer demands are largely influenced by 
society. Veblen (1899) emphasizes the importance of one’s relative position in society with 
his concepts of conspicuous leisure and consumption. Contrary to standard utility theory, 
Duesenberry’s (1949) utility concept is characterized by systematically interdependent 
utilities. Thus, he explicitly incorporated relative preferences into consumer theory. Marshall 
(1961), the creator of the modern demand theory, “recognized the power and prevalence of 
the human desire for ‘distinction’” (p. 12). Even Friedman (1962), whose theory of savings 
did not rely on relative wants, referred to the following example: “The college professor 
whose colleague wins a sweepstake will envy him but is unlikely to bear him any malice or to 
feel unjustly treated. Let the colleague receive a trivial raise that makes his salary higher than 
the professor’s own, and the professor is far more likely to feel aggrieved. After all, the 
goddess of chance, as of justice, is blind. The salary raise was deliberate judgment of relative 
merit” (p. 166, cited in McAdams, 1992, p. 103).  
More recently, several economists included the concept of interdependent preferences 
to allow social comparisons and also stressed the relevance of the relative position (e.g., 
Becker 1974, Easterlin 1974, Scitovsky 1976, Schelling 1978, Pollak 1976, Boskin and 
Sheshinski 1978, Frank 1985, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Other social sciences, such as social 
psychology, sociology or anthropology, have placed considerable emphasis on the relevance 
of relative preferences as fundamental to human motivation. The psychological theory of 
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social comparison (see Festinger 1954) and the sociological theory of relative deprivation 
(Stouffer 1949) show that comparisons with others are an important phenomenon. Relative 
deprivation theory investigates interpersonal and inter-group relations and comparisons. It 
stresses that a lower perception of one’s own (group) status or one’s own welfare in relation 
to another person (group) can be the source of hostility towards the other individuals or 
groups. A person may get frustrated when his/her situation (e.g., individual earnings) falls 
relative to the reference group. The person feels deprived. If improvement with the situation is 
slower than expected, the experience of frustration can even lead to aggression (see, e.g., 
Walker et al. 1984). However, Clark and Oswald (1996) point out that “the lack of empirical 
evidence, except of what most economists view as of a circumstantial nature, has kept relative 
deprivation theory on the periphery of research in economics” (p. 360). Clark and Oswald 
(1996) show that people’s reference groups are individuals with similar personal 
characteristics, such as gender, job etc.  
As mentioned in the introduction, happiness research has found strong evidence for 
the importance of relative position. Some empirical studies found behavioral evidence for the 
extent to which positional concerns matter. For example, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) 
queried whether women’s decisions to seek paid employment depend on the employment or 
incomes of other women. Thus, they investigate the question of whether relative income 
comparisons could affect their employment decision. As a reference group, they focus on 
women’s close relatives, but instead of making comparisons between sisters, they investigate 
whether women’s employment is affected by the employment of their sisters-in-law and 
whether women’s employment is affected by the income of their husbands relative to the 
income of their sisters’ husbands. Their results strongly support the relevance of positional 
concerns.  
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III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Empirical research on the link between pay and managerial performance has been hindered by 
the lack of available data in the past (see Lazear 2000). Therefore, a number of researchers 
use sports data – where performance can be relatively well measured – from disciplines like 
golfing (see Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 1990b; Melton and Zorn 2000; Orszag 1994), 
horse racing (Fernie and Metcalf 1999; Lynch and Zax 1998), tennis (Sunde 2003), car racing 
(Becker and Huselid 1992) and running (Maloney and McCormick 2000) in order to test 
existing theories in promotion tournaments.  
The majority of empirical evidence using sports data supports the positive impact of 
monetary incentives on sportive performance. Using golf data from the US Senior PGA Tour 
in 1984, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a) found that the amount of prize money has a 
positive influence on players’ performance. The observed effect occurs primarily in the later 
rounds of a tournament, due to the marginal returns on efforts. Players with larger marginal 
returns achieve better scores. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990b) were able to confirm most of 
these results, using European PGA Tour data from the year 1987. Only their previous finding 
that exempt players are more responsive to financial incentives was not clearly supported by 
the European data.  
Although Orszag (1994) found no statistically significant link between the amount of 
total prize money and golfers’ performance using data from the US Senior PGA Tour of 1992, 
further studies confirmed Ehrenberg’s and Bognanno’s (1990a, b) initial findings. For 
instance, using 1994 and 1995 data, and trying to eliminate any possible survival biases, 
Melton and Zorn (2000) found support for their theory that the amount of prize money in 
Senior PGA tournaments affects players’ performance. Further empirical support for a 
positive relationship between pay and performance results from research on tennis 
tournaments and horse races. Sunde (2003) uses data from the final two rounds of the most 
important tennis tournaments for professionals – from the men’s ATP tour. The results 
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indicate that the amount of prize money positively affects a player’s performance, if you 
count the number of games won and the total number of games played. 
Lynch and Zax (1998) examine the role prizes play in Arabian horse races in the US 
and Canada between 1991-1995 and find support for a positive relationship between the prize 
spread and the absolute level of performance. Along the same lines, Fernie and Metcalf 
(1999) investigate relationship between pay and performance in an unbalanced panel of 50 
individuals over eight years. They find that a hard working jockey receives higher extra pay. 
Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that reputation lags behind performance or, in other 
words, that it takes a certain time for good performance to be recognized. 
Evidence from sports data supports the proposition that the overall level of 
performance in a tournament is affected by the amount of prize money paid. Becker and 
Huselid (1992) use the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) 1990 
circuit and the International Motor Sports Association (IMSA) data for the years 1989 and 
1990. They find that increased variation in the absolute spread between higher and lower 
finishers has a statistically significant positive impact on participant performance, but at a 
diminishing rate. But little evidence has been found that the actual tournament structure 
affects the performance. Maloney and McCormick (2000) work with data from 115 foot races 
held in the southeastern United States from 1987 to 1991. The results indicate that higher 
prizes are associated with faster times for individuals already in the race and that the higher 
prizes also attract a faster field. A higher concentration of the prize money leads to higher 
effort levels. On the other hand, using road races on certified courses in the United States and 
abroad in 1994, Lynch and Zax (2000) couldn’t find a robust impact of a positive prize effect. 
After controlling for runners’ ability through individual fixed effects or world-ranking points, 
the incentive effect mostly disappears (it remains only statistically significant for the 
marathon). The results suggest that races with larger prizes lead to faster times due to the fact 
they attract faster runners rather than encourage runners to run faster.  
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Focusing on team sports, this study goes beyond investigating the performance impact 
of absolute income by studying the performance impact of relative income. However, the 
theoretical predictions are countervailing. It is therefore not possible to predict whether larger 
income differences raise or lower individual performance. 
Our first hypothesis therefore leaves open whether positional income concerns in 
general have a positive or a negative impact on individuals’ performance. 
An individual’s income is a key factor in comparisons. When people compare their 
salaries, it is generally with people close to themselves (Layard 2003). Positional concerns are 
extremely widespread in the workplace. Layard (2003) points out: “In organisations, calm can 
often be maintained only by keeping peoples’ salaries secret” (p. 8). Elster (1991) reports that, 
in China, model workers spend their bonus on a good meal for everybody to avoid harassment 
by their colleagues. A manager keeps bonuses low because he fears the other workers and 
because he wants to avoid the envy of other executive officers. Frank and Sunstein (2001) 
report that surveys of employers and employees suggest that salaries depend on what 
employees think other people are paid. Furthermore, the perception of the relative position 
has a large effect on their morale.  
Festinger (1954) stresses that people do not generally compare themselves with the 
rest of the world, but with a much more specific group, typically with others they see as being 
similar to themselves or, in his words, “close to one’s own ability” (p. 121). Thus, soccer 
players, like in other team sports, compare themselves with other soccer players, especially 
their teammates. Similarly, soldiers in World War II seem to have made comparisons 
primarily with members of their own military group (Stouffer 1949). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume that a soccer player’s income position relative to other teammates’ 
income position has an impact on his own behavior.  
There are two countervailing theories about how income differences influence 
performance. One stream of literature stresses the negative consequences of envy (see, e.g., 
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Schoeck 1966). An envious person may “prefer that others have less, and he might even 
sacrifice a little of his own wealth to achieve that end” (Zeckhauser 1991, p. 10), behavior that 
has been found in experiments (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger 1994). An envious person increases his 
utility by destroying some of the others’ assets, even if such an action carries its own costs 
(cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face). Thus a negative sum interaction is started. The 
performance of those with lower income may decrease due to frustration (“it could have or it 
should have been me”). They feel it impossible to “keep up with the Joneses” – in the case of 
soccer, with the team superstars. As a consequence, the performance is lowered.  
Relative income effects may include negative aspects that go beyond envy per se. 
Players dislike being in a lower income position, because the relative position may signal that 
they and their future prospects are lowly evaluated by others. Such perceptions and signals 
harm their relation with others, and affect their self-conception and performance. 
A contrasting theory argues that large income differences lead to better performance as 
they raise the incentive to achieve a similar status. A positional arms race is provoked through 
the process of rivalry (see Landers et al. 1996). 
The second hypothesis suggests that newcomers in a team are less influenced by 
positional concerns. Their performance is less, if at all, affected by the income differences 
existing in the team.  
The effect of positional concerns is influenced by the pressure to conform. The 
established members expect new members to adjust to the mores existing in their group or 
team. Failure to conform is punished, mainly by social sanctions, but sometimes also in other 
ways (Schoeck 1966). In the case of a soccer team, a newcomer has quite high transaction and 
adaptation costs. He has to find his place in a team that consists of many players who already 
know each other well. A player has to gain the acceptance of his colleagues in order to 
become effective in the team.  
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The third hypothesis suggests that the behavior of foreign players is less motivated by 
positional concerns than the behavior of domestic players. 
Foreign players may also be subjected to more pressure to conform than domestic 
players. However, soccer leagues in most countries today are cosmopolitan. According to our 
data set for the German Bundesliga, 45% of the players are foreigners. It is therefore to be 
expected that positional concern differences do exist, but are not very marked, between 
foreign and domestic players.  
The fourth hypothesis suggests that positional effects lowering performance are 
stronger among high performing teams. 
High performing teams tend to be more vulnerable to positional concerns than low 
performing teams. In an extraordinarily successful team, each team member tends to associate 
superior performance with his or her individual performance rather than with other team 
members. Differences in income negatively affect performance and are therefore less 
acceptable, while frustration and performance deterioration can be explained using relative 
deprivation theory. A relatively rapid average promotion rate for the group as a whole tends to 
lead to frustration about individual promotion rates. The rapid promotion of colleagues in the 
U.S. Air Corps during World War II inflated soldiers’ expectations and resulted in 
disappointment (Stouffer 1949). In the sports industry, a winner-take-all market exists in 
many situations. A small number of people get enormous amounts of money compared to 
other athletes (see Rosen 1981, Frank and Cook 1995). Top teams often have several 
superstars. For example, Table A1 in the Appendix indicates that five of the richest soccer 
players in Europe are playing for the same team (Real Madrid). Players in successful teams, 
who are paid less than other teammates, may be frustrated, which negatively affects their 
performance. Relative deprivation theory suggests that soccer players feel angry when they 
lack something they desire, but which other teammates, such as superstars, have. Players feel 
worse off when they have less fame and money than their teammates with similar attributes 
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with whom they most frequently compare themselves. Moreover, superstars profit from the 
success of their team outside of the soccer field. For example, David Beckham, best paid 
soccer star in 2004 (see Appendix A1) signed a five year 50 million EURO contract with 
Gillette in September 2004, in addition to multi-million EURO contracts with other 
companies, such as Adidas, Pepsi or Vodafone (see soccer-europe.com). His teammates 
believe that they deserve similar rewards, according to their contribution to the success of the 
team.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1. Data 
Empirical studies of the effects of income differences on managerial behavior have been 
hindered by the lack of data on individual performance and the lack of publicly available 
income data. In contrast, in certain sports, individual and team performance is well defined 
and can be readily observed. This applies to professional soccer. As a side effect, the rising 
commercialization of soccer led to better data sets. For example, in England, publicly listed 
clubs must publish their annual reports (Kern and Süssmuth 2003). In some cases (as in the 
case of the German Bundesliga), even salary data for individual players, or at least good 
proxies thereof, are available.  
This paper uses a unique data set of professional soccer players in the German premier 
soccer league Bundesliga, which is one of the most important soccer leagues in the world. 
IMP, the official data provider of the Bundesliga and several broadcasting networks, provided 
the data. This data includes soccer players’ individual performance (e.g. goals, assists, duels 
won) and personal background data (e.g. age, nationality, position) over a period of eight 
seasons between 1995/1996 and 2003/2004. We investigate an unbalanced panel of 1040 
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players covering 2833 observations. During the eight seasons, 28 different clubs participated 
in the league due to annual promotion and relegation. 
Although the salaries of soccer professionals are not officially revealed by the 
Bundesliga, there is substantial transparency. The most prominent soccer magazine in 
Germany, the Kicker Sportmagazin, develops players’ market value estimates on an annual 
basis. They provide a good proxy for actual salaries being paid by the clubs6. Before a new 
season starts, the editorial staff develops an estimation of players’ market values. This data 
has been collected in a consistent and systematic manner for several years by almost the same 
editorial team and is therefore likely to be consistent. The market values taken from Kicker 
Sportmagazin are highly correlated with players’ in the few cases where they are actually 
observed. Publicly available data are provided by Transfermarkt.de but is only available for 
the season 2003/2004. The correlation between these two data sources is high (r=0.754)7. 
These proxies for salaries are satisfactory, especially when analyzing the relative position of 
soccer players compared to their teammates. In addition, our data set includes individual 
transfer prices, as well as earnings from ticket sales, merchandizing, and sponsoring revenues 
at the team level. 
 
2. Empirical Model 
In the quantitative analyses, the following baseline equation is estimated:  
 
PERFit =  β0+β1 CTRLit+β2 ABSALi(t-1)+β3 RELSALi(t-1) +TEAMDi +TDt + µi + εit 
 
                                                 
6  Information from the Kicker Sportmagazin has been used for empirical research studies in the past (see for 
instance Eschweiler and Vieth (2004), Huebl and Swieter (2002), Lehmann and Weigand (1998, 1999) and 
Lehmann and Schulze (2005). 
7  Historical data are not provided by Transfermarkt.de as the Internet site just started to collect this information 
in 2005. Furthermore, Transfermarkt.de covers only a limited number of players in the German Bundesliga. 
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where PERFit is the performance of player i at time t. Several performance variables, such as 
goals, assists, shots, ball contacts, duels and duels won are used. These dependent variables 
refer to active involvement and success in the game. ABSALi(t-1)  is the lagged salary level of a 
player. To check for non-linearity, we also consider the squared value of the salary level. 
RELSALi(t-1)  is the lagged relative salary of player i, measured as the difference between 
teammates’ average salaries and players’ individual salaries8. Using lagged values helps to 
reduce causality problems (see detailed discussion in subsection 5). The regression also 
contains several control variables CTRLit such as AGE, AGE SQUARED, players’ position in 
the game (ATTACK, MIDFIELD, DEFENSE) and team dummy variables, as many players 
change their position in the field and in their team over time. TEAMDi is a set of team dummy 
variables and TDt is a set of time dummies controlling for possible differences in the players’ 
environment; µi is the individual effect of player i, and εit denotes the error term. 
 
3. Pay and Performance: Basic Results 
We first apply three different methodologies (pooling regression, random effect model and 
fixed model) to all available performance measures. To identify which empirical method is 
most suitable, we performed two statistical tests: the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test (see 
Breusch and Pagan 1980) of the random effect model and the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman 1978) to compare the fixed effect and the random effect models. The LM test 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the individual effect µi being 0 is rejected in all cases at 
the 1% significance level (chi-square statistics between 57 and 307). Thus, the results suggest 
that the cohort effect is not zero, which means that the pooling regression is not suitable. In all 
cases, the Hausman specification test rejects the null hypothesis that the individual-level 
                                                 
8  Experts’ estimations of players’ salaries after the previous season. As mentioned previously, we check the 
robustness of the results using the ratio instead of the difference to measure the relative income position. 
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effects are adequately modeled by a random-effect model at the 1% significance level (chi-
square statistics between 210 and 345). Thus, individual effects are not uncorrelated with the 
independent variables, which support the use of individual fixed effect models. However, it 
should be noticed that the results we obtain remain robust in all three different methodologies.  
Table 1 presents the basic estimation results, using the entire set of six dependent 
variables representing various aspects of players’ performance: goals, assists, shots, ball 
contacts, duels and duels won. The relative income has a strong negative impact for all types 
of performance, suggesting that the results are robust. The higher the difference between 
teammates’ average incomes and players’ individual incomes, the lower the performance is. 
The respective coefficients are highly statistically significant for all six dependent variables, 
controlling for the absolute level of the salary. This finding is consistent with the first 
hypothesis that the relative income level has an impact on performance and the theories 
proposing that larger income differences worsen performance. We also test the joint 
hypothesis that none of the income variables has a coefficient that differs from zero. The 
results reported in Table 1 indicate a clear rejection of this hypothesis, which supports the 
importance of the income variables. In order to test the relative income hypothesis against the 
absolute income hypothesis, we conduct an F-test on the difference between the two relevant 
coefficients after each regression. In all cases, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients of the two variables, which supports the view that it is the relative income 
position that matters.  
 
4. Robustness Tests 
In this subsection, we run several robustness tests. Usually, the available studies on the 
relative income position evaluate the distance between a person’s situation and the respective 
reference group calculating the difference. As a further robustness test, we also use the ratio 
of teammates’ income to players’ own income, instead of the difference between the two, as 
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proxy for the relative income position (the higher the value, the stronger the disadvantage in 
the relative income position). Why is it interesting to use the ratio? Let us assume the 
following situation: A player has an average annual income of $100’000 in a soccer team 
where his teammates earn on average $200’000 per year. The team management decides to 
double the salaries of all the team members. In the new constellation, the player now receives 
$200’000 while his teammates get $400’000 on average. The ratio value remains constant 
(value 2), but the difference has changed from $100’000 to $200’000. The regression results 
support the previous findings. In all cases, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients, which suggests that the relative income position matters.   
We also perform pooled estimations with team and time dummy variables, using the 
number of minutes played as the weighted variable. Additionally, we take into account 
unobservable players’ specific characteristics, with standard error adjusted for the clustering 
on individuals. The relative income coefficient is always statistically significant at the 1 % 
level and the F-Test rejects the null hypothesis of equal coefficients in all cases, even at the 1 
% level. In general, least squares estimations are not free of problems when there are certain 
deviations, i.e. cases that differ substantially from the other observations. The slope and 
intercept react sensitively to outliers. Therefore, we also run specifications that resist the pull 
of outliers, giving them, according to Hamilton (2004), a “better-than-OLS efficiency” using 
“iteratively reweighted least squares with Huber and biweight functions tuned for 95% 
Gaussian efficiency” (pp. 239-240). As a consequence, more extreme outliers are less heavily 
weighted in the regression calculations, or even dropped altogether for very extreme cases. 
The results of the six regressions indicate that both the relative and absolute income position 
have a statistically significant impact on players’ performance, with a positive sign for the 
absolute income and a negative sign for the relative income variable (see Table 2). However, 
the F-Test rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients, which supports the importance of the 
relative income position.  
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Furthermore, instead of pooling the different years together, we also investigate each 
year in a cross-sectional analysis. In 34 out of 45 cases, the joint hypothesis that neither of the 
two income variables has a coefficient that differs from zero was rejected, supporting, along 
with the F-test of equal coefficients, the importance of the relative income position.  
 
5. Causality 
The direction of the link between income and performance is unclear and has rarely been 
investigated in detail in the literature. Hall et al. (2002) stress that such a link “plays a central 
role in the theory of team sports but is seldom investigated empirically” (p. 149). In general, 
looking at the empirical research available today, most soccer studies investigate players’ 
income or teams’ income as the dependent variable and search for factors that shape it 
(Eschweiler and Vieth 2004, Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol 2004, Huebl and Swieter 2002, 
Lehmann and Weigand 1999, Lucifora and Simmons 2003, Lehmann and Schulze 2005). For 
the German soccer league, Eschweiler and Vieth (2004), Huebl and Swieter (2002), Lehmann 
and Schulze (2005), as well as Lehmann and Weigand (1999), confirm a positive pay-
performance relationship. Only a couple of studies investigate the pay-performance 
relationship the other way round, taking team performance as the dependent variable (see 
Forrest and Simmons 2002, Szymanski and Kuypers 1999). Investigating whether club 
expenditures have a positive impact on the team’s success within the English soccer league, 
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) find a significant correlation between teams’ pay and 
performance. Using data from Italian, English, and German soccer leagues, Forrest and 
Simmons (2002) find a strong team pay-performance relationship for the leagues in Italy and 
England. On the other hand, only a marginal significant wage-performance relationship has 
been found for the German Bundesliga. However, as mentioned by Hall et al. (2002), the 
causality has seldom been investigated. Do teams really get what they pay for? Some studies 
focusing on baseball doubt whether this is the case, suggesting that payrolls are not useful in 
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explaining the won-lost records in baseball (Quirk and Fort 1999, Zimbalist 1992). On the 
other hand, Hall et al. (2002) show with their data that, while there is no evidence that 
causality runs from payroll to performance over the period 1980 to 2000, the cross-section 
correlation between payroll and performance increased significantly in the 1990s. They 
furthermore found support that the relationship runs from payroll to performance, and not vice 
versa, when investigating the relationship between teams’ pay and performance with English 
soccer data using the Granger causality test. Such differences can be explained by institutional 
differences affecting causality between different sports or sport periods. In English soccer, 
players are hired on relatively short-term contracts, ranging from one to five years, and 
players’ trading and mobility are key parts of the league. The mobility costs are also lower 
due to the relative geographic proximity to each other. Furthermore, young stars at the 
beginning of their career demonstrate higher mobility, which is comparable to the stars of the 
league, where trade clauses are “virtually unheard of in English soccer” and “leading teams 
regularly trade their top stars in search of a better lineup, whereas players frequently express 
their ambition to play for a variety of clubs in a variety of leagues during their career” (p. 
158). All these factors are also visible in the German Bundesliga. Our data indicates that the 
number of active seasons in the league per player varies between one and eight, with an 
average of 2.7 seasons per player. A change of team has been observed in 12.7% of the cases. 
Similarly, Carmichael, Forrest and Simmons (1999) report that, in the English league, 12.3% 
of the players changed teams in the seasons 1993-1994.  
In addition to institutional factors, suggesting that pay affects the performance of a 
player, experts’ salary estimations before the new season starts are used as a proxy of players’ 
income. Furthermore, experts’ evaluations try to measure the market value of a player rather 
than the contract salary, which might remain constant for more than one year. Testing for 
endogeneity, a Hausman specification test is performed (see Hausman 1978). The test 
identifies whether there is sufficient difference between the coefficients of the instrumental 
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variables regression and those of the standard OLS. The Prob>chi2 statistics9 clearly indicate 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that OLS is an inconsistent estimator for our equation, 
which supports the argument that we do not have an endogeneity problem in our estimations. 
However, it can be criticized that the Hausman test depends on the quality of the instruments. 
Therefore, we report in Table 2 the 2SLS estimations together with several diagnostic tests. 
First, the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of the instruments is 
presented, checking the relevance of the excluded instruments. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant (see 
Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996). We use the lagged values of three income variables 
(relative and absolute income and the squared term of absolute income) as instruments. In our 
case, the number of instruments does not exceed the number of endogenous regressors. Thus, 
the equation to be estimated is exactly identified. Table 2 also reports the three first-stage 
regression results of the instrumental variables. The F-tests of the exclusion of the instrument 
set in the first-stage regression were statistically significant at the 1% level in all three cases. 
However, such a diagnostic has important limitations when there is more than one 
endogenous regressor. Thus, we also report the partial R2 to overcome such a problem (Shea 
1997).  The Shea’s partial R-squared is a test of the individual explanatory power, accounting 
for correlation among the instruments. The results obtained (closeness of the Shea’s R-
squares) indicate that there is enough separate variation in the instruments.  
We also test the joint hypothesis that none of the income variables has a coefficient 
that differs from zero and conduct an F-test on the difference between the relative and 
absolute income variables. In general, the 2SLS results support the previous findings, 
stressing the relevance of the positional concerns.  
                                                 
9  Estimations: goals as dependent variable (Prob>chi2=0.2093); assists (Prob>chi2=0.8535); shots 
(Prob>chi2= 0.9613); ball contacts (Prob>chi2= 0.1532; duels (Prob>chi2= 0.6579); duels won (Prob>chi2= 
0.6756). 
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In the next step, we perform a Granger-causality test to investigate the link between 
pay and performance (see Granger 1967). The notion of Granger causality suggests that, if 
lagged values of players’ income help predict current performance values in a forecast 
(formed from lagged income and lagged performance values), then income Granger cause 
performance. On the other hand, if the same lagged values help to predict the current income, 
we argue that performance Granger cause players’ pay. To conclude that one of the two came 
first, we must find unidirectional causality from one to the other. To perform the Granger 
causality test, we use symmetric regression tests, including the six performance variables and 
the absolute and relative income position independently. Table 3 shows that we are not able to 
reject the noncausality of performance on pay, nor the noncausality of pay on performance 
(and vice versa). The test results indicate a clear rejection of the hypothesis that the relative 
and the absolute income position do not Granger cause players’ performance. On the other 
hand, we also observe a rejection of the hypothesis that players’ performances do not Granger 
cause players’ absolute income and positional concerns. In sum, the results show that both are 
dependent on each other, so that the question remains unanswered when applying the Granger 
causality test.  
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Table 1: The Effect of Positional Concerns on Performance  
1 2 3 4 5   6 
Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Shots Dep. V.: Ball Contacts Dep. V.: Duels  Dep. V.: Duels Won 
FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT 
  
              
Independent Variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
SALARY                  
RELATIVE VALUE(t-1) -0.326*** -2.99 -0.397*** -4.03 -3.753*** -5.26 -73.858*** -2.85 -36.166*** -4.47 -17.768*** -4.37 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.112 -0.92 -0.247** -2.25 -1.330* -1.67 -19.929 -0.71 -2.432 -0.27 -0.877 -0.19 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.011** -2.46 -0.005 -1.35 -0.062** -2.16 -1.592* -1.83 -1.276*** -3.91 -0.653*** -3.98 
             
PLAYER CHARACTER.             
AGE 1.283*** 3.93 1.154*** 3.92 12.318*** 5.78 380.978*** 4.68 124.833*** 5.17 61.427*** 5.07 
AGE SQ -0.024*** -5.44 -0.022*** -5.37 -0.218*** -7.45 -7.370*** -5.49 -2.162*** -6.52 -1.116*** -6.70 
              
POSITION Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
TEAM Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes  
SEASON Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes  
                  
F-Test equal coeff. 8.88   5.30   26.59   11.90   40.21  39.92  
Prob > F 0.000   0.021   0.000   0.00   0.000  0.000  
F-Test joint significance 7.81   9.65   23.79   8.75   26.67  26.17  
Prob > F 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  0.00  
                  
R-Squared 0.098   0.083   0.210   0.142   0.193  0.190   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000   
Groups (Players) 1040   1040   1040   774   1040  1040   
Number of Observations 2833   2833   2833   1869   2833   2833   
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 2: Robustness Analysis  
  Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Shots Dep. V.: Ball Cont Dep. V.: Duels  Dep. V.: Duels Won 
Robust regressions (outliers) POOLED POOLED POOLED POOLED POOLED POOLED 
Independent Variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
RELATIVE VALUE(t-1) -0.193*** -3.42 -0.167** -2.55 -4.272*** -7.2 -81.414*** -3.12 -46.818*** -6.12 -22.777*** -5.79 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) 0.315*** 5.04 0.346*** 4.77 3.040*** 4.62 142.602*** 5.09 43.462*** 5.12 22.521*** 5.16 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.017*** -7.75 -0.013*** -5.16 -0.263*** -11.45 -8.398*** -10.87 -3.508*** -11.85 -1.758*** -11.55 
PLAYER CHARACTER. Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
POSITION Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
TEAM Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
SEASON Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Prob > F (F-Test equal coeff.) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
  2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   2SLS   
RELATIVE VALUE(t-1) -0.432* -1.66 -0.092 -0.41 -6.459*** -3.79 60.609 0.57 -31.973* -1.68 -17.527* -1.78 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) 0.338 1.44 0.186 0.91 2.257 1.47 279.050*** 3.30 47.697*** 2.79 23.247*** 2.62 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-1) -0.015 -0.80 0.019 1.17 -0.332*** -2.75 -8.777** -1.98 -3.305** -2.46 -1.665** -2.39 
PLAYER CHARACTER. Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
POSITION Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
TEAM Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Instruments first stage regr.:                   
RELATIVE VALUE(t-2) 
F-test  
0.400*** 9.54 0.400*** 9.54 0.400*** 9.54 0.365*** 7.56 0.400*** 9.54 0.400*** 9.54 
ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-2) 0.731*** 13.93 0.731*** 13.93 0.731*** 13.93 0.604*** 9.83 0.731*** 13.93 0.731*** 13.93 
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE(t-2) 0.094* 1.83 0.094* 1.83 0.094* 1.83 0.058 0.31 0.094* 1.83 0.094* 1.83 
P-value (Anderson LM test) 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Shea partial R2: REL. VALUE 0.130  0.130  0.130  0.042  0.130  0.130   
Shea partial R2: ABS. VALUE 0.189  0.189  0.189  0.079  0.189  0.189   
Shea partial R2: SQ ABS.VAL. 0.058  0.058  0.058  0.033  0.058  0.058  
Prob > chi2 (equal coeff.) 0.001   0.152   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Prob >chi2 (joint signif.) 0.003   0.327   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Centered R2 0.362   0.217   0.398   0.285   0.231   0.235  
Observations 1599   1599   1599   1348   1599   1599  
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 3: Granger Causality Test 
Granger Causality relative income  absolute income 
  Beta t-value Beta t-value 
Did the Performance Come First?     
H0: Performance does not Granger cause the position concerns/salary     
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Goals -0.349*** -12.98 0.283*** 11.85 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.468*** 13.95 0.633** 19.40 
Did the Positional Concerns or Salary Come First?     
H0: Positional concerns or salary do not Granger cause the 
performance 
    
Dependent Variable: Goals     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Goals 0.573*** 17.69 0.572*** 14.56 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.111*** 5.51 0.131*** 5.76 
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Assists -0.255*** -9.95 0.225*** 9.85 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.513*** 14.38 0.657*** 19.34 
Dependent Variable: Assists     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Assists 0.395*** 14.40 0.394*** 14.56 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.166*** -4.85 0.186*** 5.76 
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Shots -0.320*** -11.54 0.247*** 10.33 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.455*** 12.40 0.638*** 18.40 
Dependent Variable: Shots     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Shots 0.615*** 22.71 0.613*** 23.73 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.067*** -2.82 0.087*** 3.87 
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Ball Contacts -0.129*** -5.67 0.348*** 12.46 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.560*** 14.57 0.119*** 4.56 
Dependent Variable: Ball Contacts     
Lagged Ball Contacts 0.356*** 13.09 0.135*** 6.61 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.108*** -4.18 0.672*** 17.84 
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Duels -0.285 -12.93 0.234 13.26 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.497 13.92 0.666 19.68 
Dependent Variable: Duels     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Duels 0.447 18.33 0.447 19.24 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.058 -2.59 0.079 3.83 
Dependent Variable: Relative or Absolute Income Position     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Duels Won -0.257*** -12.03 0.223*** 12.78 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position 0.519*** 14.63 0.674*** 19.96 
Dependent Variable: Duels Won     
Independent Variables     
Lagged Duels Won 0.492*** 21.73 0.486*** 22.21 
Lagged Relative or Absolute Income Position -0.035* -1.65 0.065*** 3.24 
Notes: Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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6. Effects of Social Integration and Team Performance 
Table 4 shows the estimates referring to the behavioral consequences of positional concerns 
of newcomers in a team compared to players already integrated into the team (for at least one 
season). The sample of players is split between newcomers and integrated players. Due to 
many team changes in our data set, we are able to empirically investigate this question. In line 
with Table 1, the regressions are run with individual fixed effects. For simplicity, only the 
coefficient of the relative salary position is reported in Table 4. The 12 regressions show that, 
in line with hypothesis 2, newcomers are less driven by positional concerns. In none of the 
cases is the relative income coefficient statistically significant. In contrast, in the sub-sample 
of integrated players, the coefficients are always statistically significant, with a negative sign. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that integrated players resent differences in 
income more intensely than newcomers, diminishing their performance accordingly. 
Table 4 investigates possible differences between domestic and foreign players. The 
sample is now split into domestic and foreign players. The table reports only the coefficient 
referring to the relative salary position. The results of the regressions suggest that positional 
concern differences between domestic and foreign players are less obvious. There is, 
however, a tendency for German players to be somewhat more sensitive to the relative 
position. Nevertheless, the respective coefficient among foreign players is still statistically 
significant in many cases, although not as statistically significant as for the German players. 
The results are therefore only partially consistent with hypothesis 3.  
Table 4 finally reports the results referring to hypothesis 4, proposing that high 
performing teams experience stronger relative income concerns than low performing teams. 
In order to split the sample, the mean team performance over the investigated period (the rank 
at the end of each season) was calculated. The teams ranked above average were placed in a 
group labeled “top team”, and the remaining teams were placed in the other group. The results 
suggest that players in top teams are indeed more vulnerable to the negative consequences of 
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income differences than players in less successful teams. In all cases, the respective 
coefficient is statistically significant, with a negative sign, so the performance of the players 
declines. On the other hand, players’ performance in teams with lower performance levels is 
essentially unaffected by relative income position. Only in 1 out of 6 cases is the coefficient 
statistically significant.  
 
Table 4: Test of Further Hypotheses 
 
Dependent 
Variable Coefficient t-value N 
Dependent 
Variable Coefficient t-value N 
Not Changed 
Teams    Changed Teams    
Goals -0.361*** -3.01 2448 Goals -1.191 -1.60 385 
Assists -0.357*** -3.21 2448 Assists -1.125 -1.65 385 
Shots -3.212*** -4.15 2448 Shots -8.741 -1.57 385 
Ball Contacts -63.125** -2.20 1591 Ball Contacts -280.877 -1.34 278 
Duels -28.105*** -3.18 2448 Duels -51.586 -0.85 385 
Duels Won -13.536*** -3.03 2448 Duels Won -26.033 -0.92 385 
German Players    Foreigners    
Goals -0.424*** -3.06 1564 Goals -0.159 -0.88 1269 
Assists -0.372*** -2.79 1564 Assists -0.295* -1.94 1269 
Shots -3.702*** -3.90 1564 Shots -3.608*** -3.20 1269 
Ball Contacts -55.911 -1.47 902 Ball Contacts -76.243** -2.11 967 
Duels -35.996*** -3.43 1564 Duels -29.213** -2.21 1269 
Duels Won -17.581*** -3.30 1564 Duels Won -14.652** -2.23 1269 
Top Team    Not a Top Team    
Goals -0.271* -1.87 1568 Goals -0.170 -0.79 1265 
Assists -0.500*** -3.80 1568 Assists -0.011 -0.05 1265 
Shots -3.333*** -3.58 1568 Shots -3.193** -2.14 1265 
Ball Contacts -77.032** -2.46 1047 Ball Contacts -52.403 -0.99 822 
Duels -34.781*** -3.56 1568 Duels -16.739 -0.87 1265 
Duels Won -17.487*** -3.52 1568 Duels Won -8.448 -0.89 1265 
Notes: Robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results presented suggest that not only the absolute, but also the relative income 
position has an impact on individuals’ performance: The larger the income differences are, the 
lower is the performance. More integrated members of a (reference) group react more 
negatively than newcomers by diminished performance. 
To what extent can these findings on soccer players’ behavior be transferred to 
business practice? What can managers learn from them? First of all, the results are relevant 
for the design of incentive mechanisms. Positional concerns are important in areas where 
measurable performance is directly linked to salary (pay-for-performance). For instance, in 
many sales organizations it is common practice that sales commissions make up a large part 
of the total salary. Thus, insurance agents or financial advisors are paid according to key sales 
performance indicators, such as net new money, return on assets, and the number of products 
or policies sold within a certain period. In order to increase internal competition among the 
sales force and to push individual performance, transparency is increased by comparative 
performance rankings that are shared among the sales force. Given that performance directly 
translates into personal income, such rankings run the risk of diminishing, rather than 
improving, performance. The example of soccer suggests that the higher the differences 
between teammates’ average salaries are, the lower is overall performance. The most 
successful sellers, who dominate the rankings and earn much more than their colleagues, may 
well weaken the performance of the entire sales team.  
Pay-for-performance schemes are usually linked to output measures neglecting 
process- or context-specific factors. Accordingly, sales people at the lower end of the ranking 
may perceive that higher ranked colleagues are not performing better, but simply benefit from 
lucky punches or advantageous context factors (e.g., the districts they cover have a higher 
number of potential clients). Although pay-for-performance schemes are helpful to identify 
low performers, they tend to lower the average performance of the team. A positional arms 
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race through a process of rivalry may be provoked (Landers et al. 1996). This downside risk is 
even bigger for top performing teams, just as individuals playing in top soccer teams are more 
vulnerable to the negative consequences of a relative income disadvantage. Top performing 
sales teams may already have ambitious and self-motivated team members so that further 
stimulation of internal team competition leads to negative motivational effects. Thus, 
management is faced with the difficult task of finding the right amount of ‘healthy 
competition’ within a team.  
Pay-for-performance schemes address extrinsic motivation, and leave intrinsic 
motivation aside. According to Frey and Osterloh (2005), such schemes tend to reinforce 
selfish extrinsic motivation, crowding out intrinsic motivation. Managers need to consider the 
motivational aspects of the transparency of relative income positions in terms of 
corresponding benefits and downside risks. Negative effects of output-oriented financial 
incentives, such as pay-for-performance schemes, should be complemented with process-
oriented non-financial incentives, such as awards for the best team player, best rookie, or most 
innovative team member of the year. This takes into account the individual’s need for social 
distinction, using a non-material extrinsic reward (see Frey 2005). The empirical results are 
also relevant for the treatment of new employees joining an established team. The findings 
suggest that newcomers are less driven by positional concerns than existing team members. 
Newcomers’ performance is less affected by a disadvantage in the relative position. 
Conformism, adaptation, adjustment and short-time satisfaction due to the change (which is 
often connected with an absolute salary improvement) may account for these differences. In 
business practice, managers often switch jobs in order to increase their salary (e.g., in 
investment banking). Employees joining a new firm are therefore less affected by a 
disadvantage in their relative income position. However, over time, newcomers get used to 
their new situation and start comparing their performance/income relation with the new 
reference group. Management needs to take into consideration that, after an initial adaptation 
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period, newcomers base their income expectations on their relative position in the team. As a 
result, a perceived disadvantage in the performance/income relationship tends to lead to 
behavioral changes. 
 
 29
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Football’s Richest Players (March 2004) 
Player Club € Millions Per Year 
Beckham Real Madrid 22.2 
Zidane Real Madrid 14.05 
Nakata Bologna 11.8 
Ronaldo Real Madrid 11.09 
Raul Real Madrid 11.09 
Vieri Inter 10.35 
Owen Liverpool 9.6 
Keane Manchester United 8.87 
Figo Real Madrid 8.87 
Del Piero Juventus 7.4 
Source: www.soccer-europe.com 
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